// Copyright (c) The Diem Core Contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

// Copyright 2021 Conflux Foundation. All rights reserved.
// Conflux is free software and distributed under GNU General Public License.
// See http://www.gnu.org/licenses/

//! This module has definition of various proofs.

use super::{
    accumulator::InMemoryAccumulator, position::Position,
    verify_transaction_info, MerkleTreeInternalNode, SparseMerkleInternalNode,
    SparseMerkleLeafNode,
};
use crate::{
    account_state_blob::AccountStateBlob,
    ledger_info::LedgerInfo,
    transaction::{TransactionInfo, Version},
};
use anyhow::{bail, ensure, format_err, Result};
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzzing"))]
use diem_crypto::hash::TestOnlyHasher;
use diem_crypto::{
    hash::{
        CryptoHash, CryptoHasher, EventAccumulatorHasher,
        TransactionAccumulatorHasher, SPARSE_MERKLE_PLACEHOLDER_HASH,
    },
    HashValue,
};
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzzing"))]
use proptest_derive::Arbitrary;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::marker::PhantomData;

/// A proof that can be used authenticate an element in an accumulator given
/// trusted root hash. For example, both `LedgerInfoToTransactionInfoProof` and
/// `TransactionInfoToEventProof` can be constructed on top of this structure.
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AccumulatorProof<H> {
    /// All siblings in this proof, including the default ones. Siblings are
    /// ordered from the bottom level to the root level.
    siblings: Vec<HashValue>,

    phantom: PhantomData<H>,
}

/// Because leaves can only take half the space in the tree, any numbering of
/// the tree leaves must not take the full width of the total space.  Thus, for
/// a 64-bit ordering, our maximumm proof depth is limited to 63.
pub type LeafCount = u64;
pub const MAX_ACCUMULATOR_PROOF_DEPTH: usize = 63;
pub const MAX_ACCUMULATOR_LEAVES: LeafCount = 1 << MAX_ACCUMULATOR_PROOF_DEPTH;

impl<H> AccumulatorProof<H>
where H: CryptoHasher
{
    /// Constructs a new `AccumulatorProof` using a list of siblings.
    pub fn new(siblings: Vec<HashValue>) -> Self {
        AccumulatorProof {
            siblings,
            phantom: PhantomData,
        }
    }

    /// Returns the list of siblings in this proof.
    pub fn siblings(&self) -> &[HashValue] { &self.siblings }

    /// Verifies an element whose hash is `element_hash` and version is
    /// `element_version` exists in the accumulator whose root hash is
    /// `expected_root_hash` using the provided proof.
    pub fn verify(
        &self, expected_root_hash: HashValue, element_hash: HashValue,
        element_index: u64,
    ) -> Result<()> {
        ensure!(
            self.siblings.len() <= MAX_ACCUMULATOR_PROOF_DEPTH,
            "Accumulator proof has more than {} ({}) siblings.",
            MAX_ACCUMULATOR_PROOF_DEPTH,
            self.siblings.len()
        );

        let actual_root_hash = self
            .siblings
            .iter()
            .fold(
                (element_hash, element_index),
                // `index` denotes the index of the ancestor of the element at
                // the current level.
                |(hash, index), sibling_hash| {
                    (
                        if index % 2 == 0 {
                            // the current node is a left child.
                            MerkleTreeInternalNode::<H>::new(
                                hash,
                                *sibling_hash,
                            )
                            .hash()
                        } else {
                            // the current node is a right child.
                            MerkleTreeInternalNode::<H>::new(
                                *sibling_hash,
                                hash,
                            )
                            .hash()
                        },
                        // The index of the parent at its level.
                        index / 2,
                    )
                },
            )
            .0;
        ensure!(
            actual_root_hash == expected_root_hash,
            "Root hashes do not match. Actual root hash: {:x}. Expected root hash: {:x}.",
            actual_root_hash,
            expected_root_hash
        );

        Ok(())
    }
}

impl<H> std::fmt::Debug for AccumulatorProof<H> {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        write!(f, "AccumulatorProof {{ siblings: {:?} }}", self.siblings)
    }
}

impl<H> PartialEq for AccumulatorProof<H> {
    fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { self.siblings == other.siblings }
}

impl<H> Eq for AccumulatorProof<H> {}

pub type TransactionAccumulatorProof =
    AccumulatorProof<TransactionAccumulatorHasher>;
pub type EventAccumulatorProof = AccumulatorProof<EventAccumulatorHasher>;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzzing"))]
pub type TestAccumulatorProof = AccumulatorProof<TestOnlyHasher>;

/// A proof that can be used to authenticate an element in a Sparse Merkle Tree
/// given trusted root hash. For example, `TransactionInfoToAccountProof` can be
/// constructed on top of this structure.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SparseMerkleProof<V> {
    /// This proof can be used to authenticate whether a given leaf exists in
    /// the tree or not.
    ///     - If this is `Some(leaf_node)`
    ///         - If `leaf_node.key` equals requested key, this is an inclusion
    ///           proof and `leaf_node.value_hash` equals the hash of the
    ///           corresponding account blob.
    ///         - Otherwise this is a non-inclusion proof. `leaf_node.key` is
    ///           the only key that exists in the subtree and
    ///           `leaf_node.value_hash` equals the hash of the corresponding
    ///           account blob.
    ///     - If this is `None`, this is also a non-inclusion proof which
    ///       indicates the subtree is empty.
    leaf: Option<SparseMerkleLeafNode>,

    /// All siblings in this proof, including the default ones. Siblings are
    /// ordered from the bottom level to the root level.
    siblings: Vec<HashValue>,

    phantom: PhantomData<V>,
}

impl<V> SparseMerkleProof<V>
where V: CryptoHash
{
    /// Constructs a new `SparseMerkleProof` using leaf and a list of siblings.
    pub fn new(
        leaf: Option<SparseMerkleLeafNode>, siblings: Vec<HashValue>,
    ) -> Self {
        SparseMerkleProof {
            leaf,
            siblings,
            phantom: PhantomData,
        }
    }

    /// Returns the leaf node in this proof.
    pub fn leaf(&self) -> Option<SparseMerkleLeafNode> { self.leaf }

    /// Returns the list of siblings in this proof.
    pub fn siblings(&self) -> &[HashValue] { &self.siblings }

    /// If `element_value` is present, verifies an element whose key is
    /// `element_key` and value is `element_value` exists in the Sparse
    /// Merkle Tree using the provided proof. Otherwise verifies the proof
    /// is a valid non-inclusion proof that shows this key doesn't exist in the
    /// tree.
    pub fn verify(
        &self, expected_root_hash: HashValue, element_key: HashValue,
        element_value: Option<&V>,
    ) -> Result<()> {
        ensure!(
            self.siblings.len() <= HashValue::LENGTH_IN_BITS,
            "Sparse Merkle Tree proof has more than {} ({}) siblings.",
            HashValue::LENGTH_IN_BITS,
            self.siblings.len(),
        );

        match (element_value, self.leaf) {
            (Some(value), Some(leaf)) => {
                // This is an inclusion proof, so the key and value hash
                // provided in the proof should match
                // element_key and element_value_hash. `siblings` should prove
                // the route from the leaf node to the root.
                ensure!(
                    element_key == leaf.key,
                    "Keys do not match. Key in proof: {:x}. Expected key: {:x}.",
                    leaf.key,
                    element_key
                );
                let hash = value.hash();
                ensure!(
                    hash == leaf.value_hash,
                    "Value hashes do not match. Value hash in proof: {:x}. \
                     Expected value hash: {:x}",
                    leaf.value_hash,
                    hash,
                );
            }
            (Some(_value), None) => {
                bail!("Expected inclusion proof. Found non-inclusion proof.")
            }
            (None, Some(leaf)) => {
                // This is a non-inclusion proof. The proof intends to show that
                // if a leaf node representing `element_key` is
                // inserted, it will break a currently existing leaf
                // node represented by `proof_key` into a branch. `siblings`
                // should prove the route from that leaf node to
                // the root.
                ensure!(
                    element_key != leaf.key,
                    "Expected non-inclusion proof, but key exists in proof.",
                );
                ensure!(
                    element_key.common_prefix_bits_len(leaf.key) >= self.siblings.len(),
                    "Key would not have ended up in the subtree where the provided key in proof \
                     is the only existing key, if it existed. So this is not a valid \
                     non-inclusion proof.",
                );
            }
            (None, None) => {
                // This is a non-inclusion proof. The proof intends to show that
                // if a leaf node representing `element_key` is
                // inserted, it will show up at a currently empty
                // position. `sibling` should prove the route from this empty
                // position to the root.
            }
        }

        let current_hash = self
            .leaf
            .map_or(*SPARSE_MERKLE_PLACEHOLDER_HASH, |leaf| leaf.hash());
        let actual_root_hash = self
            .siblings
            .iter()
            .zip(
                element_key
                    .iter_bits()
                    .rev()
                    .skip(HashValue::LENGTH_IN_BITS - self.siblings.len()),
            )
            .fold(current_hash, |hash, (sibling_hash, bit)| {
                if bit {
                    SparseMerkleInternalNode::new(*sibling_hash, hash).hash()
                } else {
                    SparseMerkleInternalNode::new(hash, *sibling_hash).hash()
                }
            });
        ensure!(
            actual_root_hash == expected_root_hash,
            "Root hashes do not match. Actual root hash: {:x}. Expected root hash: {:x}.",
            actual_root_hash,
            expected_root_hash,
        );

        Ok(())
    }
}

/// A proof that can be used to show that two Merkle accumulators are consistent
/// -- the big one can be obtained by appending certain leaves to the small one.
/// For example, at some point in time a client knows that the root hash of the
/// ledger at version 10 is `old_root` (it could be a waypoint). If a server
/// wants to prove that the new ledger at version `N` is derived from the
/// old ledger the client knows, it can show the subtrees that represent all the
/// new leaves. If the client can verify that it can indeed obtain the new root
/// hash by appending these new leaves, it can be convinced that the two
/// accumulators are consistent.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AccumulatorConsistencyProof {
    /// The subtrees representing the newly appended leaves.
    subtrees: Vec<HashValue>,
}

impl AccumulatorConsistencyProof {
    /// Constructs a new `AccumulatorConsistencyProof` using given `subtrees`.
    pub fn new(subtrees: Vec<HashValue>) -> Self { Self { subtrees } }

    /// Returns the subtrees.
    pub fn subtrees(&self) -> &[HashValue] { &self.subtrees }
}

/// A proof that is similar to `AccumulatorProof`, but can be used to
/// authenticate a range of leaves. For example, given the following
/// accumulator:
///
/// ```text
///                 root
///                /     \
///              /         \
///            /             \
///           o               o
///         /   \           /   \
///        /     \         /     \
///       X       o       o       Y
///      / \     / \     / \     / \
///     o   o   a   b   c   Z   o   o
/// ```
///
/// if the proof wants to show that `[a, b, c]` exists in the accumulator, it
/// would need `X` on the left and `Y` and `Z` on the right.
#[derive(Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct AccumulatorRangeProof<H> {
    /// The siblings on the left of the path from the first leaf to the root.
    /// Siblings near the root are at the beginning of the vector.
    left_siblings: Vec<HashValue>,

    /// The sliblings on the right of the path from the last leaf to the root.
    /// Siblings near the root are at the beginning of the vector.
    right_siblings: Vec<HashValue>,

    phantom: PhantomData<H>,
}

impl<H> AccumulatorRangeProof<H>
where H: CryptoHasher
{
    /// Constructs a new `AccumulatorRangeProof` using `left_siblings` and
    /// `right_siblings`.
    pub fn new(
        left_siblings: Vec<HashValue>, right_siblings: Vec<HashValue>,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            left_siblings,
            right_siblings,
            phantom: PhantomData,
        }
    }

    /// Constructs a new `AccumulatorRangeProof` for an empty list of leaves.
    pub fn new_empty() -> Self { Self::new(vec![], vec![]) }

    /// Get all the left siblngs.
    pub fn left_siblings(&self) -> &Vec<HashValue> { &self.left_siblings }

    /// Get all the right siblngs.
    pub fn right_siblings(&self) -> &Vec<HashValue> { &self.right_siblings }

    /// Verifies the proof is correct. The verifier needs to have
    /// `expected_root_hash`, the index of the first leaf and all of the
    /// leaves in possession.
    pub fn verify(
        &self, expected_root_hash: HashValue, first_leaf_index: Option<u64>,
        leaf_hashes: &[HashValue],
    ) -> Result<()> {
        if first_leaf_index.is_none() {
            ensure!(
                leaf_hashes.is_empty(),
                "first_leaf_index indicated empty list while leaf_hashes is not empty.",
            );
            ensure!(
                self.left_siblings.is_empty() && self.right_siblings.is_empty(),
                "No siblings are needed.",
            );
            return Ok(());
        }

        ensure!(
            self.left_siblings.len() <= MAX_ACCUMULATOR_PROOF_DEPTH,
            "Proof has more than {} ({}) left siblings.",
            MAX_ACCUMULATOR_PROOF_DEPTH,
            self.left_siblings.len(),
        );
        ensure!(
            self.right_siblings.len() <= MAX_ACCUMULATOR_PROOF_DEPTH,
            "Proof has more than {} ({}) right siblings.",
            MAX_ACCUMULATOR_PROOF_DEPTH,
            self.right_siblings.len(),
        );
        ensure!(
            !leaf_hashes.is_empty(),
            "leaf_hashes is empty while first_leaf_index indicated non-empty list.",
        );

        let mut left_sibling_iter = self.left_siblings.iter().peekable();
        let mut right_sibling_iter = self.right_siblings.iter().peekable();

        let mut first_pos = Position::from_leaf_index(
            first_leaf_index.expect("first_leaf_index should not be None."),
        );
        let mut current_hashes = leaf_hashes.to_vec();
        let mut parent_hashes = vec![];

        // Keep reducing the list of hashes by combining all the children pairs,
        // until there is only one hash left.
        while current_hashes.len() > 1
            || left_sibling_iter.peek().is_some()
            || right_sibling_iter.peek().is_some()
        {
            let mut children_iter = current_hashes.iter();

            // If the first position on the current level is a right child, it
            // needs to be combined with a sibling on the left.
            if first_pos.is_right_child() {
                let left_hash = *left_sibling_iter.next().ok_or_else(|| {
                    format_err!("First child is a right child, but missing sibling on the left.")
                })?;
                let right_hash =
                    *children_iter.next().expect("The first leaf must exist.");
                parent_hashes.push(
                    MerkleTreeInternalNode::<H>::new(left_hash, right_hash)
                        .hash(),
                );
            }

            // Next we take two children at a time and compute their parents.
            let mut children_iter = children_iter.as_slice().chunks_exact(2);
            while let Some(chunk) = children_iter.next() {
                let left_hash = chunk[0];
                let right_hash = chunk[1];
                parent_hashes.push(
                    MerkleTreeInternalNode::<H>::new(left_hash, right_hash)
                        .hash(),
                );
            }

            // Similarly, if the last position is a left child, it needs to be
            // combined with a sibling on the right.
            let remainder = children_iter.remainder();
            assert!(remainder.len() <= 1);
            if !remainder.is_empty() {
                let left_hash = remainder[0];
                let right_hash = *right_sibling_iter.next().ok_or_else(|| {
                    format_err!("Last child is a left child, but missing sibling on the right.")
                })?;
                parent_hashes.push(
                    MerkleTreeInternalNode::<H>::new(left_hash, right_hash)
                        .hash(),
                );
            }

            first_pos = first_pos.parent();
            current_hashes.clear();
            std::mem::swap(&mut current_hashes, &mut parent_hashes);
        }

        ensure!(
            current_hashes[0] == expected_root_hash,
            "Root hashes do not match. Actual root hash: {:x}. Expected root hash: {:x}.",
            current_hashes[0],
            expected_root_hash,
        );

        Ok(())
    }
}

impl<H> std::fmt::Debug for AccumulatorRangeProof<H> {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        write!(
            f,
            "AccumulatorRangeProof {{ left_siblings: {:?}, right_siblings: {:?} }}",
            self.left_siblings, self.right_siblings,
        )
    }
}

impl<H> PartialEq for AccumulatorRangeProof<H> {
    fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
        self.left_siblings == other.left_siblings
            && self.right_siblings == other.right_siblings
    }
}

impl<H> Eq for AccumulatorRangeProof<H> {}

pub type TransactionAccumulatorRangeProof =
    AccumulatorRangeProof<TransactionAccumulatorHasher>;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzzing"))]
pub type TestAccumulatorRangeProof = AccumulatorRangeProof<TestOnlyHasher>;

/// A proof that can be used authenticate a range of consecutive leaves, from
/// the leftmost leaf to a certain one, in a sparse Merkle tree. For example,
/// given the following sparse Merkle tree:
///
/// ```text
///                   root
///                  /     \
///                 /       \
///                /         \
///               o           o
///              / \         / \
///             a   o       o   h
///                / \     / \
///               o   d   e   X
///              / \         / \
///             b   c       f   g
/// ```
///
/// if the proof wants show that `[a, b, c, d, e]` exists in the tree, it would
/// need the siblings `X` and `h` on the right.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SparseMerkleRangeProof {
    /// The vector of siblings on the right of the path from root to last leaf.
    /// The ones near the bottom are at the beginning of the vector. In the
    /// above example, it's `[X, h]`.
    right_siblings: Vec<HashValue>,
}

impl SparseMerkleRangeProof {
    /// Constructs a new `SparseMerkleRangeProof`.
    pub fn new(right_siblings: Vec<HashValue>) -> Self {
        Self { right_siblings }
    }

    /// Returns the siblings.
    pub fn right_siblings(&self) -> &[HashValue] { &self.right_siblings }
}

/// `TransactionInfo` and a `TransactionAccumulatorProof` connecting it to the
/// ledger root.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzzing"), derive(Arbitrary))]
pub struct TransactionInfoWithProof {
    /// The accumulator proof from ledger info root to leaf that authenticates
    /// the hash of the `TransactionInfo` object.
    ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof: TransactionAccumulatorProof,

    /// The `TransactionInfo` object at the leaf of the accumulator.
    transaction_info: TransactionInfo,
}

impl TransactionInfoWithProof {
    /// Constructs a new `TransactionWithProof` object using given
    /// `ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof`.
    pub fn new(
        ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof: TransactionAccumulatorProof,
        transaction_info: TransactionInfo,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof,
            transaction_info,
        }
    }

    /// Returns the `ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof` object in this
    /// proof.
    pub fn ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof(
        &self,
    ) -> &TransactionAccumulatorProof {
        &self.ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof
    }

    /// Returns the `transaction_info` object in this proof.
    pub fn transaction_info(&self) -> &TransactionInfo {
        &self.transaction_info
    }

    /// Verifies that the `TransactionInfo` exists in the ledger represented by
    /// the `LedgerInfo` at specified version.
    pub fn verify(
        &self, ledger_info: &LedgerInfo, transaction_version: Version,
    ) -> Result<()> {
        verify_transaction_info(
            ledger_info,
            transaction_version,
            &self.transaction_info,
            &self.ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof,
        )?;
        Ok(())
    }
}

/// The complete proof used to authenticate the state of an account. This
/// structure consists of the `AccumulatorProof` from `LedgerInfo` to
/// `TransactionInfo`, the `TransactionInfo` object and the `SparseMerkleProof`
/// from state root to the account.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzzing"), derive(Arbitrary))]
pub struct AccountStateProof {
    transaction_info_with_proof: TransactionInfoWithProof,

    /// The sparse merkle proof from state root to the account state.
    transaction_info_to_account_proof: SparseMerkleProof<AccountStateBlob>,
}

impl AccountStateProof {
    /// Constructs a new `AccountStateProof` using given
    /// `ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof`, `transaction_info` and
    /// `transaction_info_to_account_proof`.
    pub fn new(
        transaction_info_with_proof: TransactionInfoWithProof,
        transaction_info_to_account_proof: SparseMerkleProof<AccountStateBlob>,
    ) -> Self {
        AccountStateProof {
            transaction_info_with_proof,
            transaction_info_to_account_proof,
        }
    }

    /// Returns the `transaction_info_with_proof` object in this proof.
    pub fn transaction_info_with_proof(&self) -> &TransactionInfoWithProof {
        &self.transaction_info_with_proof
    }

    /// Returns the `transaction_info_to_account_proof` object in this proof.
    pub fn transaction_info_to_account_proof(
        &self,
    ) -> &SparseMerkleProof<AccountStateBlob> {
        &self.transaction_info_to_account_proof
    }

    /// Verifies that the state of an account at version `state_version` is
    /// correct using the provided proof. If `account_state_blob` is
    /// present, we expect the account to exist, otherwise we expect the
    /// account to not exist.
    pub fn verify(
        &self, ledger_info: &LedgerInfo, state_version: Version,
        account_address_hash: HashValue,
        account_state_blob: Option<&AccountStateBlob>,
    ) -> Result<()> {
        self.transaction_info_to_account_proof.verify(
            self.transaction_info_with_proof
                .transaction_info
                .state_root_hash(),
            account_address_hash,
            account_state_blob,
        )?;

        self.transaction_info_with_proof
            .verify(ledger_info, state_version)?;

        Ok(())
    }
}

/// The complete proof used to authenticate a contract event. This structure
/// consists of the `AccumulatorProof` from `LedgerInfo` to `TransactionInfo`,
/// the `TransactionInfo` object and the `AccumulatorProof` from event
/// accumulator root to the event.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzzing"), derive(Arbitrary))]
pub struct EventProof {
    transaction_info_with_proof: TransactionInfoWithProof,

    /// The accumulator proof from event root to the actual event.
    transaction_info_to_event_proof: EventAccumulatorProof,
}

impl EventProof {
    /// Constructs a new `EventProof` using given
    /// `ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof`, `transaction_info` and
    /// `transaction_info_to_event_proof`.
    pub fn new(
        transaction_info_with_proof: TransactionInfoWithProof,
        transaction_info_to_event_proof: EventAccumulatorProof,
    ) -> Self {
        EventProof {
            transaction_info_with_proof,
            transaction_info_to_event_proof,
        }
    }

    /// Returns the `transaction_info_with_proof` object in this proof.
    pub fn transaction_info_with_proof(&self) -> &TransactionInfoWithProof {
        &self.transaction_info_with_proof
    }

    /// Verifies that a given event is correct using provided proof.
    pub fn verify(
        &self, ledger_info: &LedgerInfo, event_hash: HashValue,
        transaction_version: Version,
        event_version_within_transaction: Version,
    ) -> Result<()> {
        self.transaction_info_to_event_proof.verify(
            self.transaction_info_with_proof
                .transaction_info()
                .event_root_hash(),
            event_hash,
            event_version_within_transaction,
        )?;

        self.transaction_info_with_proof
            .verify(ledger_info, transaction_version)?;

        Ok(())
    }
}

/// The complete proof used to authenticate a list of consecutive transactions.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzzing"), derive(Arbitrary))]
pub struct TransactionListProof {
    /// The accumulator range proof from ledger info root to leaves that
    /// authenticates the hashes of all `TransactionInfo` objects.
    ledger_info_to_transaction_infos_proof: TransactionAccumulatorRangeProof,

    /// The `TransactionInfo` objects that correspond to all the transactions.
    transaction_infos: Vec<TransactionInfo>,
}

impl TransactionListProof {
    /// Constructs a new `TransactionListProof` using
    /// `ledger_info_to_transaction_info_proof` and `transaction_infos`.
    pub fn new(
        ledger_info_to_transaction_infos_proof: TransactionAccumulatorRangeProof,
        transaction_infos: Vec<TransactionInfo>,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            ledger_info_to_transaction_infos_proof,
            transaction_infos,
        }
    }

    /// Constructs a proof for an empty list of transactions.
    pub fn new_empty() -> Self {
        Self::new(AccumulatorRangeProof::new_empty(), vec![])
    }

    /// Returns the list of `TransactionInfo` objects.
    pub fn transaction_infos(&self) -> &[TransactionInfo] {
        &self.transaction_infos
    }

    pub fn left_siblings(&self) -> &Vec<HashValue> {
        self.ledger_info_to_transaction_infos_proof.left_siblings()
    }

    pub fn unpack(
        self,
    ) -> (TransactionAccumulatorRangeProof, Vec<TransactionInfo>) {
        (
            self.ledger_info_to_transaction_infos_proof,
            self.transaction_infos,
        )
    }

    /// Verifies the list of transactions are correct using the proof. The
    /// verifier needs to have the ledger info and the version of the first
    /// transaction in possession.
    pub fn verify(
        &self, ledger_info: &LedgerInfo,
        first_transaction_version: Option<Version>,
        transaction_hashes: &[HashValue],
    ) -> Result<()> {
        ensure!(
            self.transaction_infos.len() == transaction_hashes.len(),
            "The number of TransactionInfo objects ({}) does not match the number of \
             transactions ({}).",
            self.transaction_infos.len(),
            transaction_hashes.len(),
        );

        itertools::zip_eq(transaction_hashes, &self.transaction_infos)
            .map(|(txn_hash, txn_info)| {
                ensure!(
                    *txn_hash == txn_info.transaction_hash(),
                    "The hash of transaction does not match the transaction info in proof. \
                     Transaction hash: {:x}. Transaction hash in txn_info: {:x}.",
                    txn_hash,
                    txn_info.transaction_hash(),
                );
                Ok(())
            })
            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?;

        let txn_info_hashes: Vec<_> = self
            .transaction_infos
            .iter()
            .map(CryptoHash::hash)
            .collect();
        self.ledger_info_to_transaction_infos_proof.verify(
            ledger_info.transaction_accumulator_hash(),
            first_transaction_version,
            &txn_info_hashes,
        )?;
        Ok(())
    }
}

/// A proof that first verifies that establishes correct computation of the root
/// and then returns the new tree to acquire a new root and version.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
pub struct AccumulatorExtensionProof<H> {
    /// Represents the roots of all the full subtrees from left to right in the
    /// original accumulator.
    frozen_subtree_roots: Vec<HashValue>,
    /// The total number of leaves in original accumulator.
    num_leaves: LeafCount,
    /// The values representing the newly appended leaves.
    leaves: Vec<HashValue>,

    hasher: PhantomData<H>,
}

impl<H: CryptoHasher> AccumulatorExtensionProof<H> {
    pub fn new(
        frozen_subtree_roots: Vec<HashValue>, num_leaves: LeafCount,
        leaves: Vec<HashValue>,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            frozen_subtree_roots,
            num_leaves,
            leaves,
            hasher: PhantomData,
        }
    }

    pub fn verify(
        &self, _original_root: HashValue,
    ) -> anyhow::Result<InMemoryAccumulator<H>> {
        let original_tree = InMemoryAccumulator::<H>::new(
            self.frozen_subtree_roots.clone(),
            self.num_leaves,
        )?;
        // ensure!(
        //     original_tree.root_hash() == original_root,
        //     "Root hashes do not match. Actual root hash: {:x}. Expected root
        // hash: {:x}.",     original_tree.root_hash(),
        //     original_root
        // );

        Ok(original_tree.append(self.leaves.as_slice()))
    }
}